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Introduction
As a common pool resource, groundwater provides 
an interesting case to study these resources from 
an economic perspective, particularly how to 
implement ‘good’ resource management. Aquifers 
are open access resources with no exclusion for 
consumption but with congestion from overuse. 
Currently, groundwater overexploitation in most 
countries is driving these resources toward 
total depletion unless limits on extraction are 
implemented. Government regulation to manage 
aquifers is a central issue because agents pump 
water from aquifers without taking water scarcity 
and the non-renewable character of aquifers into 
account in the medium term.
In Spain, one of the main problems is the deg-
radation of groundwater resources. Controlling 
overexploitation of these water reserves is one of 
the objectives of Spain’s water policy, but it is also 
an important issue for the European Union as a 
whole (Directive 2000/60/CE, October 23rd). In 
research paper
Social choice and groundwater management: application of the 
uniform rule 
Yolanda Martinez1 and Encarna Esteban2
1Departamento de Análisis Económico, Universidad de Zaragoza. Gran Via, 2-4, 50004 Zaragoza, Spain.
2Departamento de Análisis Económico, Universidad de Zaragoza. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales y 
Humanas. 44003 Teruel, Spain. 
Abstract
Y. Martinez, and E. Esteban. 2014. Social choice and groundwater management: application 
of the uniform rule. Cien. Inv. Agr. 41(2): 153-162. In recent decades, the protection of 
groundwater resources has become a key element in environmental policies around the world as 
the control of groundwater extraction is necessary to avoid groundwater depletion. This paper 
proposes a system to improve the allocation of groundwater resources based on the theory of 
social choice. We propose the implementation of the uniform rule as a mechanism to achieve 
more efficient groundwater allocation. The uniform rule combines individual preferences to 
reach collective decisions and respects the anonymity between agents. Additionally, the rule is 
Pareto efficient and strategy-proof. The paper compares the results obtained under the uniform 
rule with results achieved under other allocation rules: the proportional rule and the market 
rule. A numerical application is developed for the Western La Mancha aquifer (Spain), where 
intensive irrigated agriculture in recent decades has created serious overexploitation problems. 
The results highlight how the uniform rule is able to substantially improve the efficiency of 
groundwater extraction.
Key words: Groundwater management, market rule, social choice rule, proportional rule, 
strategy-proofness, uniform rule, Western La Mancha aquifer
Received October 14, 2013. Accepted May 12, 2014.
Corresponding author: yolandam@unizar.es
ciencia e investigación agraria154
the case of Spain, greater efforts are needed to 
control and protect groundwater resources. The 
uncontrolled increase in demand for groundwa-
ter for irrigation is evidence of the necessity for 
improved regulation to balance water supply 
and demand.
Economic solutions to balance supply and demand 
have focused on different water pricing policies 
or the introduction of water markets. Theoreti-
cally, water markets provide the most efficient 
results by reallocating water and promoting 
more rational utilization of the resource (Lee 
and Jouravlev, 1998; Zilberman and Schoengold, 
2005). However, water markets are not work-
ing as efficiently as predicted by theory due 
to institutional, political, and physical barriers 
(Qureshi et al., 2009). On the other hand, the 
implementation of water policies is not always 
easy and/or feasible because of the lack of in-
formation about extractions from aquifers. A 
major obstacle to the proper control of extraction 
is the existence of illegal groundwater pumping 
that undermines the effective implementation 
of water regulations. An example is the case 
of the Western La Mancha aquifer where there 
are approximately 50000 illegal wells that are 
beyond the control of authorities. 
An interesting alternative could be the imple-
mentation of rules developed for cost and surplus 
sharing (Moulin and Hervé, 2002; Aadland and 
Kolpin, 2004). The problem with these rules is 
that the regulator needs to have complete infor-
mation, which is not the case for groundwater 
resources. Usually, a regulator does not have 
enough information about groundwater users, and 
these agents have clear incentives to act strategi-
cally. To circumvent this information problem, a 
strand of research has developed allotment rules 
that are strategy-proof, which means that agents 
do not have incentives to lie or hide information 
from the other stakeholders (Barberà, 2005). The 
application of these rules produces allocations 
that are Pareto efficient and help to balance water 
supply and demand. 
In the case of groundwater management, the 
regulator faces two important challenges: first, 
the control of the total amount of water extracted 
to avoid resource depletion and to maintain the 
sustainability of agricultural activities and, sec-
ond, an efficient way of assigning resources to 
improve the economic benefit of the activities. 
Groundwater shortages will be more frequent as a 
result of the impacts of climate change, so under 
this scenario, the aim of this paper is to assess 
whether the regulator can achieve optimal use 
of the resource in times of shortage by design-
ing an adequate sharing-rule. To the best of our 
knowledge, the existing literature on groundwater 
economics has not yet explored the potential ben-
efits of applying allotment rules as a mechanism 
for groundwater management.
Theoretically, it is not possible to evaluate the 
loss of efficiency that arises from allotment rules 
compared with the most efficient outcome achieved 
by the market rule. Therefore, this study proposes 
a) to design an allotment rule that is coherent with 
the theoretical concept developed by the social 
choice theory and b) to perform an empirical 
comparison of the efficiency of the allotments 
resulting from i) water markets, ii) the uniform 
rule, and iii) the proportional rule. 
The allocation rules are empirically tested for 
one of the most important aquifers in Spain, the 
Western La Mancha aquifer. The results of this 
paper highlight how the implementation of the 
uniform rule in groundwater management can be 
used to achieve more efficient water allocation. 
Materials and methods
The situation in which a group of agents must 
share a rationed good has been theoretically 
analyzed in the social choice literature (Benassy, 
1982; Barberà and Jackson, 1995). This literature 
assumes that individuals have single-peaked 
preferences over their desired share of the ra-
tioned good, which means that each agent has 
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an optimal share that maximizes his/her utility. 
In other words, the greater the agent’s share, the 
greater the deviation from the optimal share and 
the lower the utility.
Thus, an allocation rule can be defined as a map 
that associates a division of the amount to be 
shared with each single-peaked preference vector. 
In the literature, this amount is normalized to 1, 
but in our case, we do not consider the utility of 
the farmer but rather the net farm benefits. The 
net farm benefit functions are strictly concave 
and thus single-peaked. 
Sprumont (1991) defined the uniform allotment 
rule in a seminal paper. This rule requires that 
the outcome complies with the Pareto criteria, is 
strategy-proof, is anonymous, is consistent, and 
satisfies the conditions of one-sided replacement-
domination and resource monotonicity (Barberà 
et al., 1997; Thomson, 1995). An allotment rule 
is strategy-proof if an agent or groups of agents 
have no incentive to misreport their preferences 
independent from what the other agents report. 
Anonymity guarantees that all agents are identical 
from the decision maker’s perspective (i.e., the 
regulator). Consistency requires that the allocation 
mechanism of the rule remain unchanged if it is 
re-applied to the remaining share after some agents 
have already received an allotment. Replacement-
domination requires that the welfare of the agents 
be equally affected if some characteristics of the 
economy change. The monotonicity condition 
imposes similar requirements on the allotments.
All of these properties seem to make the uniform 
rule a very good candidate for the ‘‘ideal’’ allot-
ment rule. The uniform allocation rule leads to an 
outcome where each agent gets what he/she wants 
within the limits of a lower bound and an upper 
bound common to all agents. In the context of 
water resources, Goetz et al. (2005) empirically 
showed that assigning irrigation water based on 
the uniform rule yields higher net farm benefits 
than the allotment mechanisms currently being 
applied (i.e., the proportional rule). In this paper, 
we apply the theoretical framework of Goetz et 
al. (2005) to groundwater resources. The main 
objective is to test whether the uniform rule can 
be an efficient instrument for the allocation of 
groundwater resources between the different 
users of a real aquifer. 
The mathematical expression for the definition 
of a uniform rule was described by Barberà et al. 
(1997). Let N define a finite set of agents: N={1, 
2, ..... n}. The water allotments are n-tuples of a 
in the set .
It is assumed that preferences are continuous and 
represented by a continuous utility function u
i
 (i 
∈ N). The agents’ benefits are measured by the 
net farm profits π(to be presented later). It is also 
assumed that preferences are single-peaked with 
a unique ideal share. We define x* as the peak of 
u
i
 (i ∈ N), and we denote it as x* (u
i
). 
Let S denote the set of all continuous utility func-
tions that represent single-peaked preferences in 
[0,1]. Preference profiles are given by n-tuples 
of u of the utility functions with u
-i
 representing 
the (n-1)-tuple obtained from u by deleting u
i
, 
and (u
i -1
,v
i
) represents the n-tuple obtained from 
u by substituting v
i
 for u
i
. 
Let denote the n-tuple of the guaranteed share 
of agent i in the tth iteration of adjusting . An 
allotment rule associates a vector of shares with 
each preference profile, so a function f:Sn→[0,1]
satisfies the feasibility .
Thus, the uniform allotment rule can be defined as:
 [1]
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above, a computer program works through the 
different stages of the algorithm to come up with 
the definitive allotments. 
In contrast, the proportional rule assigns a fixed 
amount of water that is the same for all users. 
Under this rule, users’ preferences are ignored, 
and the total water assignments just depend on 
the size of the farm (hectares). Thus, farmers 
can use all of the water assigned or not, but if 
they do not use their total allotment, they lose it 
without any compensation. We assume that users 
cannot keep their assigned water through the next 
allotment period. 
The market rule is the well-known market system. 
Farmers have an initial water endowment, but 
they have the option to sell or buy water from 
other users. Theoretically, this system achieves 
the most efficient outcome as agents with higher 
water productivity will sell water to agents with 
lower productivity. The main problem with mar-
kets is the need for well-defined institutions to 
assign groundwater rights and control the market 
transactions (Calatrava and Garrido, 2005a). 
In this paper, we compare the results achieved 
through the implementation of the three proposed 
rules (uniform, proportional, and market) for 
groundwater allocation. We consider the market 
rule as the benchmark as it is the one that achieves 
optimal water sharing. To evaluate the relative 
efficiency of the uniform rule compared with 
the proportional rule, we calculate the efficiency 
losses from both rules with respect to the results 
under the market rule.
Empirical application in the Western La Mancha 
aquifer
Study area. The Western La Mancha aquifer is one 
of the largest aquifers in the Iberian Peninsula, 
covering 5500 km2 in the upper Guadiana Basin 
of central Spain. The aquifer supports a large 
area of irrigated agriculture in central Castilla-
where λ(u) solves the restriction:
, and μ(u)solves the restric-
tion .
The uniform rule is similar to the proportional rule, 
but it is corrected to attain Pareto efficiency. Once 
the regulator knows the total amount of available 
water, he/she determines the initial guaranteed 
levels of water for the farmers. As the uniform 
rule is anonymous, the agent’s guaranteed levels 
are identical, so each farmer receives the same 
proportional amount of the total water. The second 
stage of the rule requires the farmers to provide 
their ideal shares of water. If some agents’ ideal 
shares are less than their guaranteed amounts, 
their guaranteed levels are adjusted to become 
their ideal shares. Any amount of water above 
the ideal shares is equally distributed among 
the rest of the agents, which determines their 
new guaranteed levels of water. Of course, these 
new guaranteed levels for the remaining agents 
cannot be adjusted downwards. Afterwards, if 
some agents’ ideal shares are lower than their 
new guaranteed amounts, they receive their 
ideal. The adjustment is replicated until all of 
the agents’ ideal shares are higher than or equal 
to their corresponding shares. 
The strategy-proof aspect of the uniform rule is 
essential to the correct functioning of the alloca-
tion. Intuitively, the rule is strategy-proof because 
all of the agents claiming a lower share than 
their initial, equal portion will have their claims 
met. Once the water is assigned, lower amounts 
remain for the agents who ask for more than their 
equal share. Therefore, agents who overstate 
their water demands run the risk of being left 
with less water than if they had expressed their 
true demands. In contrast, agents who request 
less than their actual demands will never receive 
more than their claims. Thus, there are economic 
incentives to always report the true ideal share, 
and in practical terms, farmers are only required 
to report their ideal share. Following the steps 
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La Mancha State. The total area of the aquifer is 
divided into three different regions: Ciudad Real, 
Albacete, and Cuenca. This aquifer supports 
approximately 200,000 ha of irrigated crops, of 
which approximately 23% correspond to cereals 
crops (mainly corn, barley, wheat, and alfalfa), 
around 15% correspond to vegetables (mainly 
watermelon, beetroot, and garlic), and finally 
around 62% correspond to fruit-trees (mainly 
vineyards) (MAPA, 2011).
Empirical model. To evaluate the effects of dif-
ferent water allotments and to determine farmers’ 
responses, we employed a model that represents 
the decisions of the individual farmers that 
maximize their private net benefits. We assumed 
five different types of farmers, i (i = 1,..., 5), 
that are considered representative of the region. 
These farmers are heterogeneous in the type of 
crops they grow and thus in the amounts water 
they use, revenues they generate and costs they 
incur. The private net benefits of each farmer are 
represented as the difference between revenues 
and costs from growing crops j ( j=1,…, 5). The 
model considers the following five crops: wheat, 
barley, corn, alfalfa and beetroot, which cover a 
total of 32,054 ha. We have chosen these crops 
due to the available information about their pro-
duction functions. 
The individual farmer’s problem under the pro-
portional rule is stated as follows:
 [2]
where p
j
 denotes the market price by crop, j (€ 
per ton); the parameter c is the price of pump-
ing water, w
ij
 (€ per m3); k
ij
 is the fixed cost of 
crop j (€ per ha); s
ij
 is the direct payment from 
the European Common Agricultural Policy 
for crop j (€ per ha), and y
ij
 is the yield of crop 
j as a function of water per ha. The variable 
h
ij
 denotes the number of hectares cultivated 
under crop j. 
The function π
i
(E
i
) determines the maximum 
value for problem [2], i.e., the total net benefits 
for farmer i given the current water pumping cost, 
c, and his/her initial water endowment, E
i
 (m3 per 
ha). In principle, the function π
i
(E
i
) also depends 
on the parameters p, c, k, and s, but as these do 
not vary at any stage of the empirical study, we 
chose to suppress them to simplify the notation. 
The formulation of equation [2] represents the 
situation when farmers receive an initial endow-
ment of water (a fixed amount) that they can either 
use completely or not; water exchanges are not 
permitted in this case. This equation can easily 
be modified to represent the water market, and 
the theoretical formulation of the market rule has 
been widely presented in the literature (see, for 
example, Martínez and Goetz, 2007).
The yield production functions, y
ij
(×), were col-
lected from Goetz et al. (2008), and Calatrava and 
Garrido (2005b) adapted them for our study area. 
They are denoted by ijyˆ . The functions for wheat, 
barley, corn and alfalfa were previously gener-
ated with the EPIC biophysical simulator package 
(Texas Agricultural Experiment Station, Temple, 
USA), which is able to reproduce the biophysical 
processes in the soil and plant growth as a func-
tion of the agricultural inputs and the weather 
(see Martínez and Albiac (2004) for a complete 
description of the calibration and validation of the 
EPIC simulation model). We have also contrasted 
the crop yield results with real data from the area 
(MAPA, 2011). The economic parameters of the 
farm model were obtained using data from the 
Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food (MAPA, 2011). Information about the crops, 
subsidies, fixed costs, and market prices as well 
as the estimated coefficients for ijyˆ  are shown in 
Table 1. The production function depends on the 
water used and follows a polynomial function:
 [3]
The maximization problem (Eq. [2]) was solved 
with the GAMS package (General Algebraic Mod-
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eling System, GAMS Development Corporation, 
Washington, USA) using the CONOPT2 algorithm 
and used to obtain the net farm benefit function, 
π
i
(E
i
), for each farmer, i. To estimate the func-
tion π
i
(E
i
), we varied the Ei parameters between 
0 and 8,000 m3 per ha. As shown in equation [4], 
the estimated net farm benefit functions, π
i
(E
i
), 
have a quadratic shape. The equation’s parameters 
are calculated using the SHAZAM econometrics 
package (SHAZAM Analytics Ltd., London, UK). 
   [4]
The net farm benefit functions, , are 
strictly concave and therefore comply with the 
uniform rule requirement that the utility of the 
benefit functions must be single-peaked with a 
unique ideal share. 
Results
Using the estimates of the benefit functions from 
equation [4], we numerically solve the market 
equilibrium (the results under the market rule) 
using GAMS. For the numerical analysis, we 
consider scenarios of different initial water endow-
ments (from 500 to 8000 m3 per ha). We report 
the results for the farmers’ private benefits and 
water use for the three rules considered: market, 
proportional and uniform. 
Table 2 shows the main results under the water 
market allocation system for percentage of water 
exchanged, water price, and total benefits based 
on the initial endowments. As expected, the less 
productive farms (F1 and F2 in our case) are 
water sellers, and the more productive farms (F3, 
F4 and F5) are water buyers. The percentage of 
water exchanged ranged between 19 and 74.5% 
of the total water, which shows that farmers will 
respond by selling their allotments to more pro-
ductive farmers in cases of severe water scarcity. 
The results show that markets are especially ac-
tive up to initial endowments of 5500 m3 per ha 
when buyers lose the economic incentive to obtain 
more water from the market. As initial endow-
ments rise, the economic incentive for exchange 
decreases to 0 when allotments are higher than 
5,500 m3 per ha. Water market prices ranged 
between 0.015 and 0.48 € per m3. When water is 
scarce, the marginal utility of water for farmers 
(the benefit) increases, and thus, water prices are 
high. In the following analysis, we will consider 
the market case as the benchmark or the most 
efficient case. Thus, we will calculate the benefit 
losses from the proportional and uniform social 
rules with respect to the market rule. 
Table 3 shows the allotments of water and the 
farmers’ benefits under the proportional rule. 
With this rule, farmers receive a fixed water 
endowment calculated as an equal share of the 
total water per hectare assigned by a regulator; 
it is assumed that the regulator knows the total 
water available in the aquifer and the recharge 
rate. When the initial endowment is higher than 
the optimal (ideal) amount for any farmer, he/she 
only pumps his/her ideal. For example, F1 attains 
his/her ideal at 2891.3 m3, and he/she uses only 
Table 1. Crop information and production function coefficients by crop.
 Wheat Barley Corn Alfalfa Beetroot
Coefficient a
i,0
1.9 1.29 -2.78 4.42 12
Coefficient a
i,1 0.599x10
-3 0.95x10-3 0.349x10-3 2.67x10-3 0.015
Coefficient a
i,2
 -0.69x10-7 -1.02x10-7 -0.269x10-6 -1.66x10-7 -0.10x10-5
Total area (ha) 4,302 20,305 3,852 756 2,839
Market price (€ kg-1) 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.05
Subsidy (€ ha-1) 270.5 270.5 346.3 - -
Fixed Costs (€ ha-1) 211.2 221.5 716.6 621.1 1,524.4
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this amount and liberates the remaining 3000 to 
the aquifer (see Table 3). Endowments in excess of 
the ideals are unproductive because the rule does 
not permit reallocation of water among farmers. 
This rule has the property of anonymity (i.e., 
the identity of the farmer is not relevant), so the 
resulting allotments are symmetrical, and farmers 
do not envy each other’s allotments. However, 
as the farmers’ preferences are not identical, the 
proportional allotments are not Pareto-efficient. 
The main advantage of the uniform rule is that it 
allows for large increases in efficiency compared 
with the proportional rule. As we can see in Table 
4, the uniform rule permits the reassignment of 
water among firms when one farm is attaining 
Table 2. Water market results.
Water 
endowment 
(m3 per ha)
Water exchanged
(%)
Water 
market price
(€ per m3)
Total 
benefits
(in 103 €)
500 74.5 0.484 9002.6
1000 60.0 0.372 14683.8
1500 55.2 0.276 20896.3
2000 43.2 0.224 22208.5
2500 40.0 0.171 22094.0
3000 39.5 0.118 21188.3
3500 36.6 0.078 20628.6
4000 30.5 0.053 20286.3
4500 24.4 0.034 19718.5
5000 19.5 0.015 19129.1
5500 0 0 19129.1
6000 0 0 19129.1
6500 0 0 19129.1
7000 0 0 19129.1
7500 0 0 19129.1
8000 0 0 19129.1
Source: MAPA (2011).
Table 3. Results under the proportional rule.
                      Water use (m3 per ha) Net benefit (€ per ha)
Water 
endowment 
(m3 per ha) F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5
Total 
benefits
(in 103 €)
500 500 500 500 500 500 372.04 261.75 -549.84 50.52 -576.90 3197.7
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 394.20 298.55 -332.75 180.90 -254.40 5890.6
1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 411.19 328.73 -135.84 301.27 43.10 8271.6
2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 423.00 352.27 40.90 411.64 315.60 10337.3
2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 429.64 369.18 197.46 512.02 563.10 12090.8
3000 2891.3 3000 3000 3000 3000 431.22 379.47 333.85 602.38 785.60 13531.9
3500 2891.3 3500 3500 3500 3500 431.22 383.12 450.06 682.75 983.10 14675.1
4000 2891.3 3525.6 4000 4000 4000 431.22 383.13 546.10 753.12 1155.60 15588.2
4500 2891.3 3525.6 4500 4500 4500 431.22 383.13 621.96 813.48 1303.10 16344.8
5000 2891.3 3525.6 5000 5000 5000 431.22 383.13 677.65 863.84 1425.60 16945.2
5500 2891.3 3525.6 5500 5500 5500 431.22 383.13 713.16 904.20 1523.10 17389.3
6000 2891.3 3525.6 6000 6000 6000 431.22 383.13 728.50 934.56 1595.60 17677.1
6500 2891.3 3525.6 6130.1 6500 6500 431.22 383.13 729.18 954.91 1643.10 17830.0
7000 2891.3 3525.6 6130.1 7000 7000 431.22 383.13 729.18 965.26 1665.60 17901.7
7500 2891.3 3525.6 6130.1 7267.5 7200 431.22 383.13 729.18 966.69 1667.60 17907.9
8000 2891.3 3525.6 6130.1 7267.5 7200 431.22 383.13 729.18 966.69 1667.60 17907.9
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its ideal share. For example, when F1 attains its 
ideal at 2891.3 m3, the rest of the water remaining 
in the endowment (3,000 or more) can be used in 
a productive manner by the rest of the farmers. 
The flexibility of the rule results in the full and 
more efficient use of initial water endowments. 
More efficient water distribution is measured 
in terms of benefit gains, and Table 4 shows the 
benefits per hectare under the uniform rule, which 
obtains higher benefits than the proportional rule 
for all relevant ranges of water allotments (from 
3,000 to 8,000 m3 per ha). In terms of benefits 
per hectare, the losses under the uniform rule are 
9 to 15% lower than under the proportional rule 
with respect to the market rule. In contrast, when 
the initial endowments are low (500 to 2,500 m3), 
both the proportional and uniform rules lead to 
the same benefits. The reason is that under severe 
water scarcity scenarios, the structure of the 
farms, i.e., their soil characteristics and climate 
conditions, limits the farmers’ crop selection 
and even prevents their farming activities. In 
fact, within the allotment range of 500 to 1,500 
m3, our results show that farmers F3 and F5 will 
abandon their activities. 
A comparison of the efficiency losses for the total 
region from using the uniform and the proportional 
rules is shown in Figure 1. The results indicate 
that the efficiency gains from the uniform rule 
equate to a minimum of 1.1 million euros and a 
maximum of 2.9 million euros, 7.5 and 17%, re-
spectively, for a range of 3,500 to 5,000 m3 per ha.
Although we do not show these numerical 
results here, we have calculated the impacts 
from duplicating pumping costs. An increase 
in pumping costs leads to better results for the 
uniform rule compared with the proportional 
rule (between 4 and 8% in the interval from 
3,500 to 5,000 m3). 
The results above indicate that the uniform rule has 
the potential to improve the economic efficiency of 
water allocation. This advantage can be explained 
by the fact that the uniform rule considers the users’ 
preferences for water allotments without requiring 
institutional changes as needed under the propor-
tional rule. The applicability of the uniform rule 
seems more straightforward than the market rule 
because the uniform rule can be applied in the current 
Table 4. Results under the uniform rule.
     Water use (m3 per ha)            Net benefits (€ per ha)
Water 
endowment 
(m3 per ha) F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5
Total 
benefits
(in 103 €)
500 500 500 500 500 500 372.04 261.75 -549.84 50.52 -576.90 3197.7
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 394.20 298.55 -332.75 180.90 -254.40 5890.6
1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 411.19 328.73 -135.84 301.27 43.10 8271.6
2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 423.0 352.27 40.90 411.64 315.60 10337.3
2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 2500 429.64 369.18 197.46 512.02 563.10 12090.8
3000 2891.3 3027.2 3027.2 3027.2 3027.2 431.22 379.83 340.69 607.01 796.98 13601.4
3500 2891.3 3525.6 3694.3 3694.3 3694.3 431.22 383.13 489.77 711.28 1053.1 15048.1
4000 2891.3 3525.6 4527.7 4527.7 4527.7 431.22 383.13 625.57 816.53 1310.54 16381.6
4500 2891.3 3525.6 5361 5361 5361 431.22 383.13 705.31 893.98 1498.5 17280.9
5000 2891.3 3525.6 6130.1 6226.5 6226.5 431.22 383.13 729.18 945.01 1620.21 17757.1
5500 2891.3 3525.6 6130.1 7267.5 7200 431.22 383.13 729.18 966.69 1667.6 17907.9
6000 2891.3 3525.6 6130.1 7267.5 7200 431.22 383.13 729.18 966.69 1667.6 17907.9
6500 2891.3 3525.6 6130.1 7267.5 7200 431.22 383.13 729.18 966.69 1667.6 17907.9
7000 2891.3 3525.6 6130.1 7267.5 7200 431.22 383.13 729.18 966.69 1667.6 17907.9
7500 2891.3 3525.6 6130.1 7267.5 7200 431.22 383.13 729.18 966.69 1667.6 17907.9
8000 2891.3 3525.6 6130.1 7267.5 7200 431.22 383.13 729.18 966.69 1667.6 17907.9
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institutional environment, so transitional transaction 
costs are not expected to occur. Furthermore, with 
the uniform rule in place, the agents do not interact 
within the market, so there are no searching or 
bargaining costs for individual farmers.
The current study evaluates the efficiency of the 
different allotment schemes without considering 
transaction costs, i.e., ex-ante costs of drafting, 
negotiating and safeguarding an agreement, and 
ex-post costs associated with contractual break-
downs and rent-seeking behavior. We think that 
the inclusion of transaction costs in the model is 
an interesting issue for future research and will 
substantially improve the comparison of the dif-
ferent allotment schemes.
Despite the limits inherent to our numerical ap-
proach, our findings may be useful for providing 
practical recommendations for the implementa-
tion of rationing rules, especially in the case of 
groundwater where water shortages and aquifer 
exhaustion could become more frequent due to 
climate change. Under a scenario of moderate 
limitations on extraction, the implementation 
of sharing rules that lower tensions between 
water users and improve efficiency with respect 
to the current sharing rule can be important in 
the long-term. 
Acknowledgements
Senior authorship is shared by the two authors. 
This research benefited from the financial support 
of the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science 
(contract ECO2010-17020).
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
0
50
0
10
00
15
00
20
00
25
00
30
00
35
00
40
00
45
00
50
00
55
00
60
00
65
00
70
00
75
00
80
00
Initial water endowment (m3/ha)
B
en
ef
it 
lo
ss
es
 (1
03
 €
)
Proportional Uniform
Figure 1. Total benefit losses from social rules with respect to the market. 
Resumen
Y. Martinez y E. Esteban. 2014. Social choice and groundwater management: application 
of the uniform rule. Cien. Inv. Agr. 41(2): 153-162. En las últimas décadas, la protección de 
los acuíferos se ha convertido en un aspecto clave en las políticas ambientales en todo el mundo. 
El control de las extracciones de agua subterránea es necesario para evitar el agotamiento de 
estos recursos. Este artículo propone un sistema para mejorar la asignación de los recursos 
subterráneos utilizando la teoría de la elección social. Se propone la introducción de la regla 
uniforme, que tiene en cuenta las preferencias de los usuarios para alcanzar decisiones colectivas, 
respecta el anonimato de los agentes y mantiene las propiedades de eficiencia de Pareto y no 
manipulación. El artículo compara los resultados obtenidos con esta regla uniforme con los de 
otras reglas de reparto del agua (regla proporcional y regla de mercado). La aplicación numérica 
ciencia e investigación agraria162
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